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ABSTRACT 
Globalization of business has heightened concerns regarding corporate conduct 
in developing countries.  Critics have charged that multinational firms in particular have 
exported social harms involving labor, the environment, bribery, and human rights to 
jurisdictions outside of their home countries.   Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and 
the associated collective action problem such opportunities suggest, highlight the need 
for strong regulatory responses to these issues.  Rather than prioritize the strengthening 
of national or international regulatory actors to address these social harms, voluntary 
corporate social responsibility initiatives have emerged as a favored response within the 
international community.  This article undertakes a critical examination of the rationale 
for these initiatives.  It argues that the premises on which they are grounded are flawed 
insofar as they ignore basic research concerning the drivers of regulatory compliance, 
fail to remedy underlying social harms, contravene broader goals of fostering strong 
regulatory institutions in developing countries, and undermine economic development to 
the extent that they erode state capacity in setting economic and regulatory policies.  As 
an alternative to purely voluntaristic measures, this article emphasizes the need to build 
the capacity of local regulatory authorities.   It cites two cases involving the use of 
domestic regulatory and enforcement power in African states as examples of how the 
empowerment of state institutions can constitute more effective responses to significant 
social harms. 
 
I. Introduction 
 Corporate activities that harm the environment, violate labor and human rights, 
and corrupt state actors and institutions remain problems in all market economies.  
Nowhere are these problems more acute than in developing countries.  On the other hand, 
in developed countries, it is generally thought that state action constitutes a principle 
remedy to market failure.  On this view, domestic regulatory systems can do the work of 
protecting the environment and worker rights, while the judiciary can ensure that human 
rights are upheld and corruption prosecuted.  Yet the general view is that, whether due to 
inadequate resources, ineptitude, or perfidy, the same expectations do not hold for 
developing countries.1 As evidence of corporate transgressions has mounted, it is 
noteworthy that there have been few calls for international super-regulators to oversee 
these matters.   Nor has much attention been devoted to remedying the presumed 
shortcomings in developing country regulatory systems that inhibit effective reductions in 
these social harms.  Instead, the solution among policy makers and many activists has 
centered around voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures.2
CSR is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of initiatives ranging from 
voluntary codes of conduct to programs whereby companies can undergo external audits 
 
1 See, e.g., The Absence of Rigor and the Failure of Implementation:  Occupational Health and Safety in 
China, 9 IN. J. OCCUP. ENVIRON. HEALTH 309 (2003). 
2 Examples of these initiatives include AccountAbility 1000 Framework, AA1000 Assurance Standard, 
Business Principles for Countering Bribery, CERES Principles, Clean Clothes Campaign:  Model Code, 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, Ethical Trading Initiative:  Base Code, Fair Labor Association:  
Workplace Code of Conduct, UN Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative, Global Sullivan Principles 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development, Marine 
Stewardship Council’s Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing, The Natural Step Principles, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Shell Business Principles, SIGMA:  Sustainable Guidelines for 
Management. 
 
to verify the adequacy of their practices in a variety of areas of social concern. 3 
Although generally lacking formal state power of sanction, these efforts look to 
international law for their normative authority.   As such, they intend to apply sometimes-
latent international legal prescriptions directly to corporations.  Following the practices of 
many state-level regulatory programs in recent years, these initiatives are consistent with 
the broader trend in regulatory policy away from so-called “command and control” 
regulatory techniques and towards voluntary firm-level self-regulation and self-policing.4
While important in helping to galvanize public opinion around the issues, this 
article contends that, as currently constituted, voluntary CSR initiatives remain 
problematic.  Properly understood, voluntary CSR measures should supplement not 
supplant state regulation.5 Yet supporters of voluntary CSR initiatives fail to recognize 
this fact.  They equivocate on the role of government regulation and thus create a 
 
3 Among OECD countries, these areas are generally thought to be delimited by the law and thus CSR is 
sometimes assumed to refer to efforts to exceed legal requirements.  Other discussions, particularly those 
concerning developing countries, invoke CSR as a way of supplanting or overcoming inadequacies in 
domestic legal orders.  Confusing matters further is the recent trend among business interests in the United 
States and elsewhere to re-define the term by leaving out the word “social”.  Hence, one sees press 
conferences with business executives promoting “corporate responsibility,” which usually amounts to no 
more than executives and firms obeying the law.  The precise boundary between CSR initiatives and legal 
requirements are unclear in these discussions. For the purposes of this paper, I will consider CSR as the 
effort to overcome inadequacies in existing legal structures and enforcement regimes in developing 
countries with respect to the social issues identified above.   What comes under criticism in this paper are 
the attempts by various actors to remedy these problems primarily through voluntary measures. 
4 For a description of this view, see OECD, FROM INTERVENTIONISM TO REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 
(2002) on the need to maximize voluntary compliance. 
5 For a version of this view, see Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation:  Analyzing Non-Governmental 
Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, POL’Y STUD. J. (2003). 
confused picture as to the proper role of CSR.6 The reasons for this equivocation are not 
incidental but rather central to the CSR movement.7
There are two reasons for this phenomenon.  The first issue relates to the 
competing discourses involved in addressing CSR questions.  Roughly stated, these 
discourses can be defined as globalist or developmentalist.  The globalists include those 
whose inspiration for addressing CSR matters stems from globalization, which they 
reduce to questions of foreign direct investment (FDI) and outsourcing by multinational 
corporations in developing countries.8 Among the globalists are those who posit a 
declining—even shrinking role—for the state.9 Globalists contend that multinational 
corporations (MNCs) elude national regulation because they operate in multiple 
 
6 See, e.g., GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT: A PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE VISION AND NINE 
PRINCIPLES at 25 (“Whilst recognizing that the role of governments in ensuring respect for human rights 
remains extremely important...”).   Although this comment seems quite strange—rather than just extremely 
important, most people view the state as the central, dominant authority in ensuring adherence to human 
rights law—it is a formulation that is quite common in CSR literature.    
7Indeed, in the European Commission’s statement on CSR, voluntarism is an essential defining element of 
these initiatives. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COM (2001) 366 (defining CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis”).  This bias towards voluntarism with respect to adherence to fundamental human rights by 
firms has generated some unseemly formulations.  In a brochure on CSR from the international law firm 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, clients are advised that “companies should seek to avoid compulsory or 
child labor” and “take due account of the need to protect the environment.”  Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Corporate Social Responsibility (2004) (emphasis added).  It should go without saying that on 
any formulation, firms have an absolute moral imperative to avoid compulsory labor.  Likewise, does the 
notion of “taking due account” of the environment in countries of operations not seem incredibly weak in 
contrast to similar legal obligations? 
8 See, e.g., Michael Santoro, Beyond Codes of Conduct and Marketing:  An Organizational Integrity 
Approach to Global Labor Practices, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 406 (2003).  The introduction to this article 
illustrates the central focus on issues of outsourcing by multinationals: 
“At the turn of the century, multinational corporations (MNCs) have learned—often the hard way as a 
result of embarrassing exposes—that their bottom line can suffer when they fail to live up to public 
expectations about honoring human rights in third world countries.  Among other things, global marketing 
firms are being asked to provide transparent assurance that their suppliers in third world nations avoid the 
use of child labor and honor workers rights to acceptable living wages, overtime pay, safe and healthy 
working conditions and free association.” 
Id. at 408.  Similarly, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer contends that the rationale for CSR is attributed to 
globalization of business and market liberalization that has led many companies to initiate international 
operations.  Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 7, at 5.   
9 See Nicola Phillips, State Debates in International Political Economy in ed. Phillips, GLOBALIZING INT’L
POL. ECON. (2005) (describing hyperglobalist view); DAVID HELD, GOVERNARE LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 30 
(2005) (stating that many have posited the end of the nation state as a result of globalization). 
jurisdictions.10 On the other hand, as the name suggests, developmentalists view matters 
from a developmental perspective.   On this view, the challenge of private sector 
activities in developing countries is not limited to issues of FDI and outsourcing but 
rather involves broader issues of institutional and market strengthening and coordination 
with other development priorities.   
In this paper, I contend that the globalists have framed the debate incorrectly.   A 
key reason for this conceptual mistake is that the globalists have wrongly assumed that 
the state is in decline.  This view is a broad-brush swipe rather than the product of 
detailed analysis.  Indeed, developments in the field of comparative and international 
political economy show that the story is much more complicated.11 On this view, rather 
than international convergence towards one model of capitalism, states maintain 
distinctive types of market economies and respond to the pressures of globalization in 
distinct ways.12 Moreover, state level regulatory systems remain central to defining the 
trajectories of different systems.13 Other studies speak more of a changing role of the 
state or of the state being constrained in certain respects, but belie the hyperbolic claim 
that the state is declining in importance, is less relevant, or is unable to do its job.14 
Rather than true across the board, the constraints hypothesis may be true in some respects 
but less in others.  In particular, while states may be constrained in areas of monetary 
 
10 CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL: HOST STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 11 (2002) (citing dominant view that MNCs can 
take advantage of the complexity of political and legal systems to create a world of their own which must 
accommodate itself in the conduct of its operations to many legal systems but is not in any real sense 
subject to any of them). 
11 See generally, PETER A. HALL AND DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (2001).   
12 Id. 
13 HALL AND SOSKICE, supra 11 at 4 (“Our premise is that many of the most important institutional 
structures –notably systems of labor market regulation, of education and training, and of corporate 
governance—depend on the presence of regulatory regimes that are the preserve of the nation-state”). 
14 LINDA WEISS, STATES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: BRINGING DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS BACK IN 10 
(2004).  See also Held, supra note 9, at 30. 
policy and financial markets, there appears to be much less support for the view that the 
state is constrained in matters of social, trade, industry, and innovation policies.15 Even 
the sly multinational enterprises (MNEs) credited for supposedly eluding law and 
regulation of states, are subject to the laws of every jurisdiction in which they do 
business.16 Indeed, the race to the bottom argument often made in reference to MNEs’ 
supposed attempts to seek out unregulated markets also does not stand up to scrutiny.17 If 
states cannot be shown to be subject to substantial constraints in the exercise of power to 
control social harms by firms, then a key argument for international rather than state 
based corporate social responsibility measures would seem to be lost.   Moreover, even if 
states can be shown to be too weak to deal with implacable MNCs, then what grounds 
exist for believing that mere voluntary measures will prove sufficiently potent 
instruments of control? 
Second, the globalists have reduced most of the problems involving economic 
activity in developing countries to exogenous factors attributable to linkages with 
advanced industrial economies.  Economic globalization thus emerges as the culprit, 
 
15 WEISS, supra note 14. 
16 DAY WALLACE, supra note 10.   A common but mistaken argument is that because the revenues of 
MNEs often exceed the budgets of various developing countries, the private firms essentially dominate 
those states.  See Pall A. Davidsson, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility within the EU,
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529 (2002)(stating that economic power of MNEs often surpasses that of states).  But 
this is a rather hasty conclusion to draw from comparing these figures.  As will be described later in the 
article, states wield many instruments with which to enforce law and regulation, and it cannot be said ipso 
facto that modest state revenues preclude states from enforcing law against even the largest international 
firms. 
17 Examining studies of tax rates, supposedly a key driver of firm arbitrage between jurisdictions, suggests 
that the argument for a race to the bottom is misleading.  See Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and 
National Policies:  Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?, 52 INTER. ORG. 787, 801 (1998) (citing tendency 
for multinational producers to locate in countries with large public economies and high taxes); M. Ramesh, 
Globalization and Social Security Expansion in East Asia, in ed. WEISS, supra note 14 at 83 (showing 
significant expansion of social welfare in  Korea and Taiwan during period when they were integrating 
rapidly with the global economy); John M. Hobson, Disappearing taxes or ‘race to the middle’?, in WEISS,
supra note 14, at 49 (noting that states have been able to attract increased foreign investment while 
simultaneously maintaining and in some cases increasing corporate income tax yields). 
while endogenous sources of social harm are ignored.18 While recognizing that the 
problems associated with economic globalization are real, the problems affecting 
capitalist development in developing countries are not reducible to problems of economic 
globalization.  Were we to magically ensure that all outsourcing and FDI were done in 
accordance with the highest international standards, many developing countries would 
still face massive problems of regulation and governance directly related to the types of 
social harms that CSR attempts to address.  Only the developmentalist perspective speaks 
to those needs. 
The globalists’ third misconception relates to the reasons behind this set of 
assumptions.  To uncover these reasons, one must examine recent economic and political 
history.  As this paper will argue, that history exposes the intellectual roots of voluntary 
CSR programs in neoliberal economics.  It calls into question a shared assumption among 
CSR advocates that market failure can be remedied by market mechanisms. 
This paper is divided into five parts.  Part II consists of an overview of some of 
the intellectual, policy, and business trends that have fed support for CSR programs.   
This paper contends that a proper understanding of CSR initiatives involves recognition 
of its origins in the post Reagan-Thatcher regulatory agenda, which has changed 
fundamental expectations about business regulation and economic development.  Part III 
critiques some of the key assumptions concerning voluntary CSR programs with 
particular attention to concerns in developing countries.  It highlights two significant 
problems, first, the lack of rigorous enforcement of such initiatives, and, second, the lack 
of state involvement in their enforcement and definition, which undermines broader 
development goals of democratic governance and the creation of well-regulated market 
 
18 See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 7. 
economies.  In light of these problems, this paper argues for using capacity building of 
legal and regulatory authorities as a way to address these issues.  Part IV describes and 
analyzes two examples of how domestic legal and regulatory actors can be empowered to 
further the public interest in their societies.  A conclusion follows in part V. 
II. Intellectual history 
To understand where the voluntary CSR movement draws its raison d’être, one
must consider recent intellectual history.  Three general trends are worth noting: first, the 
demise of the post-WWII regulatory and developmental state, as exemplified by the New 
Deal institutions in the United States and social democracy in Europe; second, market-
oriented radical transformations affecting business organizations; and, third, the 
emergence, as a result of these trends, of new programs of self-regulation throughout the 
developed world.  What follows is a simplification of these complex trends, however, it 
should nevertheless help contextualize the environment in which voluntary CSR 
programs have emerged. 
A. Changing Nature of the State 
The modern regulatory state emerged alongside the growth of industrial 
economies.19 The conditions necessitating greater governmental control over economic 
activities include increases in harmful externalities, such as pollution, injuries to workers, 
monopolistic tendencies within industry, a multiplication of the number of economic 
actors, and an increase in technological complexity requiring greater coordination 
between firms.  Government’s ability to address these new concerns depended upon the 
creation of large administrative units or bureaucracies to support its efforts.  The 
 
19 See ROBERT BALDWIN AND MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY STRATEGY AND 
PRACTICE (1999) (describing rise of regulatory state in Britain throughout nineteenth century).   
multiplicity of actors and situations required a vast regulatory apparatus supported by 
large resource allocations. 
For the sake of illustration and because of its influential role in affecting 
regulatory practices internationally, I will relate the United States experience.  In the 
United States, the modern regulatory state was, in large part, an outgrowth of the New 
Deal.  Prior to that time, the federal government played a relatively small economic and 
social role.20 What regulation existed was accomplished primarily through common law 
courts.21 Judges, not bureaucrats, were the arbiters of regulation.  As the guardians of the 
common law, judges resisted attempts by legislatures to enact laws protecting health, 
safety, and the environment as unwarranted infringements on the judiciary’s power to 
determine proper regulatory objectives.  The Lochner decision22, in which the Supreme 
Court struck down a New York statute limiting the hours bakers could work on the 
grounds that it unconstitutionally infringed the freedom to contract, was one of the more 
notable examples of this type of thinking.  Legislative efforts to regulate the market grew 
significantly with the New Deal.  After initially suffering losses when the Supreme Court 
cast aside a number of early New Deal enactments, the Roosevelt administration 
succeeded in enacting numerous laws to minimize social harms of the market.23 This 
marked the beginning of a larger trend.  Between the New Deal and the 1970s, the federal 
government was to create dozens of new agencies designed to regulate a whole range of 
 
20 ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 38 (1998). 
21 CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 12-13 
(1990) 
22 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
23SUNSTEIN, supra note 21 at 20. 
industries and remedy a variety of social ills.24 The scope of the changes that occurred 
has led some constitutional scholars to consider the period a second American “rights 
revolution” or an effective amendment to the federal constitution.25 Similar trends 
occurred in Western European and developing countries.  The growth of capitalism 
everywhere spurred efforts to restrain its negative effects. 
Noteworthy among these developments is the fact that regulation underwent a 
qualitative change from the New Deal to the 1960s and 1970s.  In the New Deal period, 
the primacy of Keynesian economics led to a regulatory agenda designed to better 
manage the economy.26 By the 1960s and 1970s, government regulation became more 
concerned with promoting individual rights than with promoting collective goods.27 
Across OECD countries, as regulation became less about demand management through 
such institutions as centralized wage bargaining and more about individual rights (e.g. 
laws against discrimination in employment), broader support for a dominant state 
presence in the economy eroded.   
The emergence of economic stagnation and growing business unrest over 
bureaucratic “red tape”, fed arguments for curtailing the growth of the federal 
bureaucracy in the U.S.28 The economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s--
stagflation, energy shortages, and a decline in international competitiveness--led to 
complaints over regulatory controls.29 Congress also began asserting its power, seeking 
 
24Id. at 24.  Noting that between 1930 and 1940, the federal government created 17 new agencies but that 
later expansion of the regulatory state far exceeded this number.  Between 1960 and the mid-1980s, more 
than 55 new agencies were created. 
25Id. See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
26 SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 21. 
27 Id. at 29. 
28 NICOLAS SPULBER, MANAGING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 107 (1989). 
29OECD, TOWARDS FULL EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY (1977). 
to reign in administrative action.30 Likewise, courts started scrutinizing agency actions 
with greater frequency.31 Immediately after his election, President Reagan began a 
program of comprehensive regulatory reform.  The reforms instituted by Reagan at that 
time have since been transmitted throughout the advanced industrialized economies and 
developing countries.32 It is important to review their main elements. 
The signing of Executive Order 12291 by President Reagan ushered in a 
comprehensive program of ex ante procedures and criteria applied to any new 
regulation.33 This change involved the empowerment of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget to act as a central authority for scrutinizing new regulatory initiatives.  Two 
moves proved particularly instrumental in setting the climate in which emphasis on 
voluntary CSR grew.  First, the order mandated the use of cost benefit analysis and the 
choice of the least burdensome alternative in connection with any proposed regulation.34 
Second, it mandated that regulators consider alternatives before advancing new 
regulations.35 With this subtle shift, the view of the state as a taking on a strong role in 
 
30The attempt of Congress to create a legislative veto was a particularly noteworthy instance of a larger 
movement for legislative oversight. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).   
31SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 30. 
32 See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: GLOBAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE 
1990S (2000).  The author describes these developments in reference specifically to the IMF experience, 
however, the observations have wider applicability:  “The term "silent revolution" refers here to a shift in 
the prevailing paradigm for international economic and political relations, away from tendencies toward 
autarky, insularity, mercantilism, and governmental planning and control over economic activity; and 
toward a common set of beliefs and policies based on open international trade and finance, competitive 
pricing and production decisions, and cooperation between countries. To a great extent, the silent 
revolution of the 1980s resulted from a shift in economic philosophy toward a new classical synthesis in 
which government has an indirect role in, but not a direct responsibility for, ensuring national economic 
prosperity; in which private economic activity is promoted through good governance and the development 
of physical and social infrastructure.”  Id. 
33 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 1981 at 127.   
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
controlling capitalism was replaced by a general presumption against regulation unless it 
could be otherwise justified.36 
The OECD regulatory reform program illustrates how diffuse these practices have 
become.  According to the OECD, states have adopted regulatory management systems 
involving explicit standards for regulatory quality, the use of regulatory impact analysis, 
systematic public consultation on regulation, use of alternatives to regulation, review and 
updating of regulation, and reduction in administrative red tape.37 It is safe to say that 
these principles represent mainstream thinking on regulation today.    
Aside from the question of defining proper regulatory ends was the question of 
means.  Critics complained that “command and control” regulatory regimes were costly 
and unnecessarily punitive.38 This attack sought to eliminate rigid governmental 
prescriptions and instead allow for greater flexibility in achieving traditional regulatory 
aims.39 The result has been, among other things, a growing shift to self-regulatory or 
management-based regulatory strategies, described more fully in Part II.C below. 
The second prong of the regulatory reform agenda has been a program of 
deregulation in areas including communications and broadcasting, discrimination, 
endangered species, occupational health and safety, public utilities, and the 
environment.40 Deregulatory programs were followed by successive waves of re-
regulation.  In the area of economic regulation, states created new frameworks for 
introducing competition into previously uncompetitive industries through unbundling, 
 
36 See, e.g., BOUGHTON, supra note 32 (referencing generally light-handed approach to the regulation of 
markets by the Reagan Admininstration). 
37 See generally, OECD, supra note 4. 
38 BALDWIN AND CAVE, supra note 19 at 35-39. 
39 Id. 
40 SPULBER, supra note 28 at 107. 
withdrawal of subsidies, and use of competition law.  In the area of social regulation, 
enforcement was frequently weakened and in some areas regulatory burdens lightened.   
The push for deregulation and regulatory reform originating in OECD countries 
has since been exported globally through the intervention of international financial 
institutions.  Drawing from the widely shared belief that excessive regulation hampered 
economic growth, development agencies promote the reduction of unnecessary regulatory 
barriers such as excessive red tape.41 Likewise, structural adjustment programs have 
forced reductions in state spending that have compromised state regulatory capacity in 
some instances.42 International trade agreements have also driven states to remove rules 
that discriminate against foreign firms, thus reducing regulatory burdens in certain areas. 
The third change in the nature of regulation was the demise of the developmental 
state in both OECD and developing countries.  Slowing growth in OECD countries 
helped bring about the decline of the Keynesian developmental state.  Driven by 
declining growth rates, tax revolt, and the need for fiscal restraint to avoid currency 
devaluation in a post-Bretton Woods environment, state dirigiste policies fell into 
disrepute.  Restraints on state subsidies for national champions and caps on budget 
deficits as a result of economic integration further tied the state’s hands.  In combination 
with many of these forces, developing countries faced added pressure for fiscal prudence 
from international financial institutions.  In light of the manifest shortcomings of import 
substitution policies and the subsequent debt crisis, structural adjustment programs and 
conditionality were imposed on states as a way of reducing wasteful support for state 
owned enterprises and profligate expenditures on state owned industry and infrastructure.  
 
41 See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS 2004. 
42 See, e.g., Rainforest Foundation, Forest Management Transparency, Governance and the Law:  Lessons 
from the Congo Basin 39 (2003), available at http://www.forestsmonitor.org/afleg/en/Case_studies.pdf. 
The rise of the good governance agenda and its application to states in the South further 
pressured them to avoid the risk of corruption through wholesale reductions in state-
sponsored investment.43 Privatization, competition, and a reduction of state involvement 
in the economy have become central components of economic policy more generally and 
development policy more specifically.44 The simultaneous reduction in domestic demand 
management and downward pricing pressures on products due to international 
competition and technological change, brought about a decline in aggregate demand in 
many countries.45 Consequences notwithstanding, private sector development is now the 
dominant, if not sole, economic policy paradigm.46 Osborne and Gaebler’s now famous 
metaphor about the state steering and not rowing has diffused internationally.47 A
dramatically different model of the state has become dominant in OECD countries, 
developing countries generally, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. 
B. Increased Managerial Innovation and Flexibility 
In the last thirty years, management and production have undergone tremendous 
change.  It is not, as the most exuberant proponents of the “new economy” suggest, one 
that renders traditional criteria for valuing companies wholly irrelevant.  Instead, it 
constitutes a change in the fundamental approaches to private enterprise.  According to 
the new approach to management, the ability to change, constantly improve processes, 
and reduce costs is a hallmark of success.48 
43BOUGHTON, supra note 32. 
44 See, e.g., MICHAEL U. KLEIN AND BITA HADJIMICHAEL, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT (World 
Bank 2003) (“Openness and competition are key reasons we can have hope for poverty reduction.”) 
45 DEAN BAKER et al., GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY (1998). 
46 See, e.g., KLEIN AND HADJIMICHAEL, supra note 44. 
47 DAVID OSBORNE AND GABLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS 
TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25 (1993). 
48 See generally, Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work Practices 
for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135 (2004). 
Throughout much of the Twentieth Century, business organizations, particularly 
larger firms, tended to be bureaucratic, centrally organized,49 and, as a result, slow and 
frequently inefficient.  This corporate model, typified by the system of Fordist mass 
production, established set manufacturing processes and rigid management techniques, 
thereby limiting opportunities for change.50 Gradually throughout developed economies, 
reductions in aggregate demand, increased international competition that limited pricing 
power, shortened product cycles that rendered inventories obsolete more quickly, and 
growing knowledge intensity of work, strained more bureaucratic business models.51 In 
addition, the emergence and success of many high technology companies, with few fixed 
assets, led many to see flexibility and intellectual capital as the hallmarks of success.52 
Three interrelated changes are particularly noteworthy.  First, firms began 
incorporating team production methods on an increasing basis.  In contrast to the large 
centrally directed firm described in the work of Alfred Chandler, decentralized structures, 
oriented to team or group decision making, became diffuse.53 Under the influence of 
Japanese production techniques, firms began incorporating production practices that put 
increasing control in the hands of employee directed teams.54 Decentralized groups were 
given the opportunity to use their judgment to set priorities and improve processes.55 
49 Charles Sabel, Design, Deliberation, Democracy:  On the New Pragmatism of Firms and Public 
Institutions (1995), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html. 
50 See generally, CHARLES SABEL AND MICHAEL PIORE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1982).  See also 
ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND (1977). 
51 SABEL AND PIORE, supra note 50. 
52Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, at 
4. 
53Sabel, supra note 49, see also Helper et al. supra note 51, at 5. 
54 Benjamin Coriat, The ‘Abominable Ohno Production System.’  Competences, Monitoring, and Routines 
in Japanese Production Systems, in THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES 217, 
228 (Giovanni Dosi et al. eds., 2000). 
55 Eileen Appelbaum & Peter Berg, High Performance Work Systems: Giving Workers a Stake, in THE 
NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 102, 103 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000).   
Second, many firms began to incorporate flexible production techniques.   The 
move to flexible production, shortened production times and made product offerings 
more responsive to changes in demand.56 Whereas a high degree of responsiveness to 
demand used to be confined to small, craft producers, the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century saw the profusion of these techniques in larger firms.57 The development of just 
in time inventory practices, for instance, has allowed businesses to anticipate and respond 
to demands of the market while eliminating sunken inventory costs in outmoded and 
uncompetitive products.58 Today’s firms can combine a high degree of flexibility in 
product offerings with high throughput. 
Third, firms instituted new approaches to quality control.  Techniques such as 
benchmarking, or “iterated goal setting”, in which the development of a new product is 
based on comparisons of best practices in an industry and consideration of competing 
alternative products,59 have become recognized as leading management techniques.  The 
central feature of this type of process is the review and modification of these goals in 
light of experience.60 Error detection and correction in many firms now occur in real 
time.61 Moreover, through the process of standardization, such thinking has even 
become institutionalized.  ISO 9000, a widely-used management system standard, has 
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effectively codified the practice of constant monitoring and continuous improvement with 
respect to quality assurance.62 
These changes in business organization have allowed firms to adapt to uncertainty 
caused by rapid changes in economic institutional and technological environments.63 In 
contrast to more rigid manufacturing processes, in which manufacturing decisions are 
seen as fixed, the new system treats every arrangement as provisional.64 
As a result of these changes in business practices, the task of the regulator has 
become more challenging.  No longer can governments bank on consistent business 
practices in setting regulatory requirements.  The very malleability of management 
practices makes it difficult to simply pinpoint the business practices for which regulation 
is needed.  Before agencies can promulgate regulations controlling a certain type of 
conduct, a given practice may become outmoded.  The relative decline in vertical 
integration strategies brought about through contracting, has given rise to more network 
forms of organization.  As consequence of this increased flexibility in business, 
governments are always playing catch-up to the economy.  It is not that firms necessarily 
evade regulatory initiatives but instead they may change their practices so frequently that 
regulators are often slow to catch up.65 Within this framework, traditional command and 
control regulatory systems have had to change. 
C. Self-regulation Comes of Age 
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While self-regulation has existed in a variety of forms for years (e.g. stock 
exchanges and the legal profession in the United States), a growing sense of the 
inadequacy of command and control regulation in the 1980s and 1990s led to increased 
attention to alternative regulatory programs.  The idea was a pragmatic response to 
diminished resources and a realization that traditional regulation had generated 
unintended consequences and frequently been ineffective.66 In the United States, the 
advent of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 set the stage for greater 
reliance on firm-level compliance as a way to leverage dwindling state resources and 
ensure that regulatory objectives were achieved.67 Throughout the OECD, regulators no 
longer see companies purely in adversarial terms but also frequently recognize them as 
important partners in achieving regulatory objectives.68 
As a result, firm-level self-regulatory measures have grown in importance.   
Typically compliance or management-based regulatory strategies provide incentives for 
firms to voluntarily implement compliance systems and sanction firms that lack such 
systems.69 While the approaches taken differ between jurisdictions, there is widespread 
agreement that declining state resources, growth in the number of regulated entities, 
complexity of business, and the inefficacy of traditional command and control regulation, 
require regulators to leverage the resources of private entities in pursuing regulatory 
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objectives.70 Similar considerations would seem to hold in developing countries, albeit to 
different extents and degrees.    
In some cases, rather than focus exclusively on adherence to clear cut rules 
process-oriented solutions have been advocated.  ISO 9000, the quality assurance 
standard, and ISO 14000, the environmental standard developed under the auspices of the 
International Organization for Standardization have proved influential in putting the 
management systems approach at the center of debates on regulation.  These approaches 
afford companies greater latitude in achieving compliance:  so long as they adopt the 
proper processes for addressing a particular regulatory issue, companies can satisfy 
regulatory requirements.  Of course, this approach has its shortcomings as many 
observers have noted that companies can have the correct process in place while failing to 
achieve substantive performance criteria. 
III. Critique of Voluntary CSR from a Developmental Perspective 
 In light of the historical context provided above, this section undertakes a critical 
examination of voluntary corporate social responsibility.  First, I argue that if norms such 
as protecting the environment or human rights are generally valued, taking a purely 
voluntary approach to promoting compliance with such norms will produce few results.  
Second, I argue that notwithstanding the presumed international dimension of CSR, 
control of individual business firms is generally the province of states.  Third, I argue that 
voluntary, international CSR programs undermine development priorities of 
strengthening domestic governance insofar as domestic regulatory institutions fail to 
develop their capacities to protect their citizens.  Finally, I contend that a more robust 
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model of regulation complements efforts to transcend the neoliberal model of the state by 
positing a positive role for the state in driving economic development. 
A. Generating Compliance: The Limitations of CSR 
The best argument that voluntary CSR proponents advance as the means of 
generating compliance with CSR norms is based on economic incentives.  For the most 
part, these economic incentives and disincentives are linked to corporate reputation.  
Thus, the theory CSR proponents advance maintains that firms respond to CSR related 
concerns as a result of the self-interested goal of boosting their reputations with 
consumers, trading partners and investors.  A good reputation is thought to translate into 
improved sales and profitability or higher stock price and a bad reputation into their 
opposite.  With respect to the influence on sales, reputational effects would be most 
evident for companies having strong consumer brands.  Examples include the consumer 
pressure brought to bear on companies such as Nike for its reportedly abusive labor 
practices or Shell for its failure to intercede on behalf of Ken Saro Wiwa.  In the jargon 
of CSR, a key challenge of the movement is to exploit these “reputational drivers” 
effectively.  Firms will act in a socially responsible manner in order to maintain positive 
reputations among the public, proponents argue.  It is worth noting that this argument is 
neoclassical in substance.  Unpacking the argument exposes the following logic: 
(1) Firms will choose to do what is economically in their best interests.   
(2) Acting in a socially responsible manner clearly inures to their economic 
benefit.   
(3) Therefore, firms will follow social responsibility norms.   
As the following analysis of regulation and compliance shows, this logic is 
fundamentally mistaken.  If CSR was intended to correct market failure, does it make 
sense to rely exclusively on market forces as the solution?71 
Even conceding that certain firms might be responsive to incentives for improved 
stock price or customer pressures, these factors are unlikely to generate a high level of 
compliance.  Consumers, trading partners and shareholders may not countenance slave 
labor practices by firms or massive disregard for the environment such as occurred at 
Bhopal.  Yet given the large number of companies operating in the world, the limited 
attention of the actors involved, and the voluntary nature of the whole arrangement, it is 
unlikely that companies will be driven to achieve more than a minimum of social 
responsibility.  Most companies are simply unknown to most consumers and, as 
experience has shown, to the extent consumers seem to respond to these issues, they have 
focused on a handful of companies.  Likewise, pressures of investors to promote CSR 
among companies is essentially limited to listed firms and in any event generate 
relatively low powered incentives to which companies respond by trying to avoid major 
scandals. 
 Yet there is reason to question the strong rationality assumptions that CSR 
proponents attribute to firms.  It is not self-evident that even if the posited incentives 
exist, firms will necessarily choose to act upon them.  Indeed, this assumption is itself 
neoclassical in nature.  The evolutionary tradition in economics and the related field of 
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capabilities theory have supplemented the neoclassical view by exploring limitations on 
profit maximizing behavior.  Nelson and Winter have argued convincingly that rather 
than maximize profits at every stage, firms are profit seeking.72 Existing paths and the 
results of intrafirm “truces” may persuade many employees to leave well enough alone.73 
In summary, there is reason to believe that serious flaws are involved with any 
CSR initiative that relies almost exclusively on market forces to drive firm adoption.  
Although discussions of CSR have tended to view them as without historical parallel, this 
is certainly not the case.  Studies of organizational compliance are well advanced and 
bear intrinsically on the question of what public policy actors can do to induce firm 
compliance with particular norms.  Of particular relevance are socio-legal studies and 
comparative analyses of organizational compliance in OECD countries. 
As recognized by many regulatory scholars, there are four types of companies 
with which regulators have to deal.74 Those who know the law and are willing to follow 
it (Group A), those who don’t know the law but would like to be law abiding (Group B), 
those who know the law and don’t want to follow it (Group C) and those who don’t know 
the law and don’t wish to be law abiding (Group D).  Most CSR literature does not even 
reflect these basics.  As this analysis suggests, Group A firms are willing to comply on 
intrinsic grounds.  Yet for CSR proponents, it seems that it is precisely Group A that 
represents its greatest source of support.  Surely CSR must be more ambitious than 
seeking to ensure that the good continue to be good. 
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The most convincing argument in favor of voluntary CSR strategies concerns 
Group B firms.  In this case, CSR can serve an educational purpose.  The precise limits of 
CSR are visible with respect to companies in Groups C and D.  On this logic, CSR 
proponents contend that Group C and D firms should follow CSR norms because it is 
economically rational to do so.  To these proponents, I ask: as rational economic actors, 
why aren’t they already doing it?  Bounded rationality can be the only answer.  Indeed, 
bounded rationality may explain the move towards CSR by Group B firms.  Yet if Group 
C and D firms, after having been shown the error of their ways by CSR campaigners, 
have not acted, can one still rely on bounded rationality to explain their behavior?  Could 
it be that there are good, countervailing economic reasons to explain the socially 
irresponsible behavior of these firms?   
 A wide range of compliance literature supports these arguments.  Generally it 
shows that voluntary standards are not self-enforcing.  Firm compliance decisions are not 
solely responsive to the threat of sanction, however, some form of sanction is an essential 
element to firms’ willingness comply.75 In competitive markets without the risk of 
sanction, the likelihood of opportunism by firms goes way up.76 One of the leading 
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proposals for management-based regulation advanced by Ayers and Braithewaite 
recognizes this fact explicitly.  They call not for voluntary self-regulation as a stand-alone 
solution, but instead as part of a system of governmentally-enforced self-regulation.77 
They reason that firms must have discretion to determine appropriate means of achieving 
regulatory goals but that government must oversee and enforce relevant standards, 
particularly in dealing with less cooperative firms. 
In contrast to CSR discussions in which reputational advantage is the dominant 
driver, research has helped conceptualize compliance in terms of a dynamic process.  
Bridget Hutter conceptualizes compliance as an outgrowth of a long standing relationship 
and series of interactions between the regulated firm and regulators.78 From this 
perspective, one can say that firms have an enforcement “career”, meaning, an ongoing 
relationship between the firm and the regulator.79 “Enforcement officials interpret, 
classify, and test the regulated and act accordingly,” she writes.80 Consistent with the 
notion of graduated enforcement pyramids developed by Braithwaite and Ayers, as this 
regulatory career unfolds, the regulator can gradually ratchet up coercion in the event that 
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the regulated firm fails to comply.81 This view does not assume that coercion must be
used but rather it recognizes that achieving something more than compliance among the 
willing requires an array of instruments and regulatory authorities with historical and on-
going knowledge of the entities they regulate.82 In other words, voluntary compliance 
may occur spontaneously but any serious discussion of compliance with a given 
regulatory regime requires some reference to enforcement tools as well.83 Indeed, the 
very notion of voluntary compliance posited by Ayers and Braithwaite contends that the 
coercive power of the regulator is essential to generating voluntary compliance.84 
Sophisticated public policies reflect this realistic understanding of the place of 
sanctions in any regulatory regime.  One innovative approach to assessing the likelihood 
that regulatory compliance will occur was developed by the Ministry of Justice and 
Erasmus University in the Netherlands.  They produced a Table of Eleven (T11) key 
determinants of compliance that effectively synthesized much of the learning around the 
topic.85 What this framework shows is that the factors driving compliance decisions are 
multifaceted and complex.   The T11 indicators break down the analysis into three 
aspects:  (1) spontaneous compliance dimensions (i.e. those that generate voluntary 
compliance), (2) control dimensions (factors based on the likelihood of enforcement as 
drivers of the compliance decision), and (3) sanctions dimensions. 
 Consistent with the earlier discussion of Group A and B firms, most CSR 
compliance can be attributed to spontaneous factors.  Following the T11 analysis, 
 
81 AYERS AND BRAITHWAITE, supra note 66 
82 See, e.g., HUTTER, supra note 78, at 196-205. 
83AYRES AND BRAITHWAITE, supra note 66 at 19 (“strategy based totally on persuasion and self-regulation 
will be exploited when actors are motivated by economic rationality”).  
84 Id. at 39 (“the key contention of this regulatory theory is that the existence of the gradients and peaks of 
the two enforcement pyramids channel most of the regulatory action to the base of the pyramid—in the 
realms of persuasion and self-regulation”). 
85 OECD, The State of Regulatory Compliance (1999).
knowledge and general acceptance of particular CSR rules or standards by firms, their 
normative commitment to such rules or standards, and the possibility of informal control, 
account for most CSR compliance.86 Contrary to radical skeptics, the existence of these 
influences show that firms are not wholly opportunistic. 
 Again, this is only the beginning of the analysis.  Voluntary CSR initiatives—
unlike binding state-imposed regulations--can rely only on these spontaneous drivers of 
compliance.  Standing alone these considerations are insufficient.  They ignore Group C 
and D firms and fail to take into account the fact that the phenomenon of spontaneous 
compliance occurs within a regulatory system that provides for sanctions for non-
compliance.  To deal with Group C and D firms (and to motivate A and B firms), the 
control and sanctions dimensions of the T11 framework are of critical importance.87 
Factors such as the control probability (T7) and detection probability (T8) reflect the fact 
that scrutiny of firms by regulators contributes significantly to levels of compliance.  
When dealing with uncooperative firms, the state’s ability to devote substantial resources 
to such investigations is an important contributor to its success.   Moreover, regulatory 
and law enforcement bodies can enforce their audit powers through the courts.  The state 
can even employ the threat of enforcement as a bluffing strategy designed to push 
recalcitrant firms into compliance.88 Such factors clearly influence the seriousness with 
which the audit is perceived by the audited firm.  It is only logical that it also positively 
influences compliance.  In contrast, private verification schemes, although more thorough 
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than self-reporting systems, do not permit auditors an unlimited amount of time.  Without 
anyone mandating the audit, the incentives of the firms undergoing audit to limit the costs 
of the endeavor by reducing its duration are great. 
 Finally, sanctions regulators possess extend beyond direct economic penalties.  
They can issue warnings, suspend licenses of firms or their agents, deny permits, issue 
injunctions, and increase the frequency of inspections.  As suggested by the enforcement 
pyramid approach of Ayres and Braithewaite, regulatory and enforcement bodies can 
adjust their actions in response to behavior of the regulated community.  Serious 
economic consequences follow from the state’s use of any of these powers against 
particular firms.  In contrast, CSR initiatives must rely on the power of reputational risks, 
which have only an indirect or uncertain cost element, as disincentives.  
 C. Regulating Firms is a State Function 
 Despite an increase in international commerce and law-making, regulation 
remains state based.89 On a general level, voluntary CSR initiatives seek to create an 
international regulatory framework that applies directly to firms, thereby bypassing the 
state.  In light of the constraints on state expenditures arising from pressures of 
international financial institutions and global capital markets, this attempt to regulate 
from above is understandable.  As a matter of regulatory and development policy, 
however, it is mistaken. 
States occupy a privileged position in connection with regulatory activities.90 
Much attention has been given to state activity in shaping the substance of international 
law through international fora, but along the way the central role of state-based regulation 
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in the process of controlling economic activity has become obscured.  Hirst and 
Thompson put it well when they describe the state as the “locus of governance in a 
galaxy of increasingly interlinked institutions of governance above and below it.”91 In 
one sense, state-level regulatory systems constitute that locus.92 Only states can 
undertake the necessary work to ensure that international norms to which they have 
bound themselves in international fora are respected in their territories.   
International fora produce norms that by their very nature are generalizable across 
a variety of jurisdictions.  Cosmopolitan democracy93 remains a valid concept when it 
comes to defining generally agreed norms but cannot do the heavy lifting required to 
regulate locally, something that must occur through local deliberative democratic 
processes.  Moreover, regulation of firms is in its essence particularistic.  It is something 
states are uniquely able to do.   
Only states have the knowledge necessary to regulate industries operating within 
their territories.  They incorporate firms, whether as subsidiaries of multinationals or 
domestic firms.  Regulatory personnel at the state level have intimate knowledge of the 
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regulatory framework existing in their jurisdictions.  They understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of domestic regulatory capacity.  Likewise, they can assess the relative need 
for self-regulatory measures versus traditional command and control regulation, for 
instance.  Practically speaking, structures to facilitate the participation of the public in 
setting standards that concern matters of CSR can and should grow out of the state.   
In comparison to voluntary CSR measures, which at best offer spotty coverage of 
firms and industries, states regulate comprehensively.94 An environmental law, for 
instance, applies to all firms of a certain size.  Health and safety laws apply to all firms 
operating certain types of facilities.  CSR measures cannot claim the same degree of 
coverage.  Indeed, they generally apply to only a subset of (self-selecting) firms.  They 
may target only firms in certain industries or those which agree to participate in a given 
program.  The poverty of their coverage makes the rationale for the existence of CSR 
initiatives—states’ lack of regulatory capacity—ring hollow. 
States also act in ways that have direct monetary incentive or disincentive effects.  
This power is most evident with respect to fiscal matters.  States can, for instance, tax 
firms that pollute excessively, for example.  Compared to reputational effects, which may 
indirectly harm corporate profits, the use of fiscal powers can reduce or increase profits 
directly, thus constituting a potentially high powered incentive device.  In contrast to the 
massive array of financial incentives with which states can further or impede socially 
responsible behavior, CSR appears to lack much horsepower. 
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D. Learning to Regulate (and Govern) 
 At their core, arguments promoting voluntary standards over regulation in 
developing countries rest on utilitarian or pragmatic justifications.  Proponents reason 
that many states are unable to fulfill their obligations to enforce international or domestic 
legal norms and thus the international community must create some alternative system to 
prevent inappropriate practices from occurring.  This pragmatic justification places all of 
the value to society of adherence to these norms on the outcomes that follow and thus 
ignores the social gains realized in the process of achieving those results.  In other words, 
how society comes to adhere to particular norms generates social goods distinguishable 
from the outcomes.  Such a process is particularly important for struggling democracies 
and emerging market economies. 
 In many developing countries, state structures are weak.95 Regulators who are 
resource strapped lack the ability or means to ensure that rules are followed.  Poor 
enforcement authorities, such as justice ministries, hinder vigorous litigation.  Corruption 
distorts state functions.  Despite the prevalence of these phenomena, it is safe to say that 
in many developing countries, attempts to improve the functioning of the state are on-
going.  But reforms do not occur in a vacuum.  For reforms of the state to take hold, the 
state must take tangible actions to address concerns of the society.96 The enforcement of 
norms relating to corporate social responsibility thus constitutes an important part of the 
development of the state alongside the development of the market. 
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By developing their capacity to regulate economic activity and harmful corporate 
conduct, states gain needed knowledge.  Initial enforcement actions and prosecutions of 
corporations may be difficult and challenging but by going through the process, 
enforcement personnel learn two things:  first, that it can be done, and, second, the 
techniques and challenges involved in holding firms to account for their actions.   Overall 
state capacity improves as a result of these efforts. 
 With successful enforcement efforts comes improved public esteem.  State actors 
and enforcement bodies gain credibility in the eyes of the public and build the reputations 
of the responsible institutions.  As state institutions are seen to be effective, regulatory 
legitimacy is enhanced.97 In this sense, command and control regulatory systems so 
frequently disparaged among regulatory scholars today, may, through their bright line 
rules and clear enforcement practices, positively influence the public’s perception of the 
state’s legitimacy.98 Moreover, the benefits of strong regulatory legitimacy strengthen 
both the state and the market.  Unless the development of state capacity occurs in tandem 
with the development of the market, it becomes more likely that the weakness of the 
former will jeopardize the latter. 
 Alternatively, if the state shows itself to be ineffective in controlling market 
actors, then the state may come under attack.  Angered by incompetence or lack of vigor 
in the executive, citizens may demand more.   For regulation and, more broadly, 
governance to improve in many developing states, the conditions for effective redress and 
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communication between state and citizen must be strengthened.99 Perpetuating the 
existing system of elite dominance can only retard the development process. 
Strengthening these conditions involves the generation of local knowledge on 
what is the preferred way to control corporations in particular jurisdictions.  Different 
jurisdictions will experience different labor practices, different production practices, and 
different incentive schemes.  Different tax structures may enable regulators to provide 
incentives or disincentives that are unique to a jurisdiction.  Different corporation laws 
may facilitate the imposition of sanctions designed to correspond to prevailing 
organizational structures in a jurisdiction.  Different civil and criminal procedure laws 
may make it more or less likely that actions can be successfully brought or defended.   
Different licensing regimes may give regulators tools with which to control firm behavior 
that are unique to a jurisdiction. 
Likewise, regulatory institutions learn to regulate better by gaining an improved 
understanding of the firms within their jurisdiction.100 To the extent that regulators 
develop deeper knowledge of firm histories in their jurisdiction, they can better determine 
what regulatory techniques to apply.  States--not private auditing firms, NGOs making an 
occasional visit to a country, or the press--are best equipped to distinguish cooperative 
from uncooperative firms and regulate accordingly.101 
The learning that occurs within regulatory and enforcement bodies is not 
consigned to each institution standing alone.  Such bodies can share practical experience 
horizontally.  As it becomes understood that one method of dealing with violators works 
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better than another, knowledge can be shared across agencies.  An environmental agency 
may share useful experience with an occupational health and safety regulator that 
improves practice in the latter, for example.  Good knowledge dissemination practices 
with respect to regulation and enforcement may improve the state of public management 
overall. 
Nor is learning confined to regulatory institutions.  The process of defining and 
developing a legal understanding about law and regulations designed to implement CSR 
norms concerning the environment, labor or human rights domestically, enriches 
countries’ legal systems.  States implementing statutory or regulatory provisions related 
to CSR, can tailor their enactments to the practice of their legal systems overall while 
responding to the views of their citizens in determining an acceptable level of rigor of 
such provisions.  Under conditions of scarce resources, the state must ensure coordination 
of regulatory priorities with broader development agendas.  Moreover, after the 
enactment of relevant norms, courts and administrative tribunals can then develop 
doctrine and case law that ensures the compatibility between such norms and domestic 
systems.  Through legislative and judicial activity, domestic actors know whom to turn to 
if dissatisfied.  National debates can occur relating to the best way of regulating negative 
labor or environmental practices.  Likewise, courts can explore and work out national 
positions on the line between nuisance and environmental harm or tort and human rights 
violations.  By rooting CSR provisions in domestic legal systems, countries may 
organically tie such provisions to their shared experiences and hopes. 
The view that states must exercise regulatory power within their jurisdictions over 
CSR matters does not limit them to command and control regulation.  States may opt to 
develop structures in which management system standards or other more flexible 
regulatory structures are built into existing systems.  Even states that have endorsed 
specific non-governmental standards, such as ISO 14000, have retained their power to 
regulate.  Rather than exempting ISO 14000 certified firms from all forms of 
environmental regulation, for instance, certified firms may qualify for less intrusive or 
less frequent inspections or receive favorable treatment in enforcement and settlement 
proceedings.102 Yet the decision as to whether such matters ought best be left to wholly 
self-regulatory initiatives, if ever justified, must undergo much closer scrutiny in states 
struggling to assert their power and establish their legitimacy. 
For these reasons, the expansion of voluntary CSR regimes that sidestep state 
institutions creates significant problems for developing countries.  Even assuming that 
such initiatives can deliver the social goods, they leave state institutions no better off.  
Indeed, to the extent that regulation of the economy comes to be seen as something that 
non-state actors accomplish, the priority of building regulatory capacity in already fragile 
African states will be underemphasized.  As their markets develop, the gap between the 
states’ abilities to oversee the market and actual market activity will only widen.  Under 
these conditions, if voluntary initiatives, even the more rigorous ones, leave social 
conditions unimproved, the posited shortfall in state regulatory capacity will become of 
even greater concern. 
E. Beyond Economic Orthodoxy 
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The call to put the state back in the center of private sector regulation is only one 
part of the call to overcome the most pernicious applications of economic orthodoxy.  
Rather than stand by as mere passive observers of the development process as implicitly 
or even explicitly favored by neoliberals, states must develop their capacities to foster 
development in strategic and intelligent ways.  Turning over power to control (i.e. 
regulate) socially harmful practices to the private sector through CSR initiatives, 
effectively undermines the development of state capacity not only to regulate but also 
expand the domestic economy and mitigate social harms.103 
The history of neoliberalism is a history that casts state intervention in the 
economy as an essential evil to be avoided.  Yet continuing declines in economic growth 
rates in African states even after neoliberal reforms suggests that development policy that 
looks exclusively to the private sector may be misdirected.  As the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are forced to reconsider the approach to structural 
adjustment, a new understanding of the role of the state and the need for more flexibility 
in economic policy is emerging.104 Heterodox economists like Robert Wade and Joseph 
Stieglitz have made compelling arguments for a larger role of the state in economic 
development. From this perspective, notwithstanding the failure of certain state-led 
development policies, such as import substitution, the state is viewed as an important 
catalyst for growth.105 The state is thus not merely the source of the “rules of the game” 
 
103 See George Parker, Hungary can hold to its eurozone course, says new Prime Minister, FIN. TIMES, 23 
October 2004.  In this article, the Prime Minister of Hungary is quoted as saying that “We have got 700,000 
people out of 10m who don’t have enough money to eat one decent meal a day...you can’t tell them to take 
responsibility for their own welfare, that the state doesn’t have a role.”  Id. 
104 See, e.g., IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Evaluation of the IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (2004).   
105 See ATUL KOHLI, STATE-DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE 
GLOBAL PERIPHERY (2004) (“there is a stunning lack of evidence for the proposition that less government 
facilitates more rapid industrialization in the developing world....On the contrary, the evidence shows that 
after which point it must get out of the way.  Viewed in this context, voluntary CSR 
appears lost in the wilderness.  At its core CSR posits a central role for non-state, 
voluntary approaches to regulation in relevant fields.  An improved economic 
understanding of the role of the state versus the market sees the need for a strong state 
capable of investing to promote growth rather than a weak state buttressed by regulatory 
forces that operate independent of its authority.  Promotion of economic growth as well 
as the reduction of negative externalities can only happen through strong state 
institutions. 
If it is true that the neoliberal critique of the state has been behind the rise of 
voluntary CSR initiatives and to the extent that development experience now suggests 
that this critique has been oversold, one cannot consider voluntary CSR without first 
rethinking the view of the state.  That role involves designing regulatory policy in 
harmony with economic and development policy.  A precondition for the state playing a 
role in promoting economic development is improved state capacity.  In departing from 
neoliberalism—both in its anti-Keynesian and liberalization phases—CSR begins to 
appear less compelling.  If a greater role for the state is accepted—particularly in 
developing countries—there is no longer a need to accept the enfeebled solution of 
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voluntarism but instead we may look towards a revitalized state that can advance 
development that is just and vigorous. 
V. Examples of Alternatives: African Cases 
 The critique offered in the previous section proceeded on a general level.  The 
following section sets out some specific examples of how state regulatory and 
enforcement authorities in African states can work to develop strong responses to societal 
needs.  The first seeks to show the value of state anti-corruption enforcement.  This case 
illustrates how building state capacity can enable states to confront socially irresponsible 
corporate conduct.  The second concerns a more technical matter involving efforts of 
state regulators to coordinate their regulatory approaches and ensure equitable treatment 
in international negotiations.  In keeping with the developmentalist view advanced in this 
paper, these initiatives speak to the challenges involved in creating functioning regulatory 
and enforcement systems rather than suggest that ambitions have been categorically 
achieved. 
A. Lesotho High Water Dam Prosecutions 
 In 1999, the Attorney General of Lesotho charged a former chief executive of the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) with accepting $2 million in bribes from 
international companies over ten years.106 Sponsored by the World Bank, the European 
Union, and the European Investment Bank, the LHWP is Africa’s largest dam project 
ever, intended to supply South Africa with water and Lesotho with electricity.  The 
Lesotho courts found the former official guilty on thirteen counts of bribery linked to the 
LHWP and sentenced him to twelve years in prison.107 After his conviction, more than a 
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dozen European and North American construction companies were also named in the 
scandal.108 
Among the firms named were Germany’s Lahmeyer International GmbH (owned 
by RWE).  Lahmeyer was charged on twelve counts of bribery and convicted of seven.109 
It was fined approximately $1.6 million.  On appeal these counts were all sustained and 
the fines were increased to approximately $2 million.  Similarly, Canada’s Acres 
International was convicted of two counts of bribery and succeeded in having one count 
overturned on appeal.  It was fined approximately $2 million for its actions.  In addition 
to these prosecutions, the French firm, Schneider International, pled guilty and was fined 
$1.6 million for its involvement.  Finally, an agent of an Italian member of the 
consortium Impreglio, pled guilty to arranging to bribe the chief executive of the project.  
These actions represent “the first time that courts in a developing country have convicted 
an international company for paying bribes rather than just prosecuting a local official for 
taking bribes.”110 
By all accounts, the resources required to conduct a prosecution of this magnitude 
were substantial.111 The litigants were located all over the world.  Tracing the proceeds 
of the bribes required judicial cooperation with jurisdictions including Switzerland.  
Aside from Switzerland, most other OECD countries and the EU failed to support these 
prosecutions.112 More strangely, none of the project sponsors were willing to offset the 
costs of the prosecutions.113 Moreover, because the project was set up as a corporation 
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separate from the state, the Lesotho government had no recourse to any funds held by the 
corporation to offset its costs.  South Africa had considered offsetting some of the 
expenses, however, to date this offer has apparently not been fulfilled.  The United States 
provided some assistance in the form of computers and Westlaw access established in the 
law library in the Court of Appeals building.114 
Notwithstanding these impediments, the Lesotho courts performed well.  
According to judges on the Courts of Appeals and High Court, the difficulty involved in 
coming to terms with large legal teams assembled by the firms under indictment was 
significant.115 The dedication of time and resources for a small country such as Lesotho 
was also considerable.  Demonstrating the commitment of the government, this poor 
country facing an HIV/AIDS epidemic had to commit resources to this case that could 
have been used elsewhere.116 Judges from other jurisdictions and practitioners provided 
assistance to the judiciary and attorney general’s office.117 To maximize judicial 
resources, one judge was assigned to the cases full time.  The noticeable pride of those 
involved in the trials was that they had launched a major prosecution on a matter of 
principle.  In the words of a former South African judge, the Lesotho prosecuting 
authorities “set an example of good governance, and have delivered a blow on behalf of 
all countries who face major challenges in strengthening their infrastructure through 
project activity.”118 It is a victory for the rule of law that a country like Lesotho was able 
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to break through international banking secrecy in just over a year and make a successful 
case against some of the world’s largest and most powerful contractors. 
B. Forest Law Enforcement and Governance in Cameroon 
 
The Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) initiative serves 
as a clear instance where the international community has chosen the route of enhancing 
regulation and enforcement as opposed to voluntary CSR in addressing significant risks 
to the environment.  After holding a summit in Yaounde in 1999, the states in Western 
Congo Basin held a summit in 1999 designed to ensure that forests remained a renewable 
resource and able to ensure biodiversity.  Later Ministers from some of these countries 
indicated their interest in focusing on forest law enforcement and governance issues.  
From these beginnings, the AFLEG initiative was launched under the auspices of the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as a way of strengthening a high 
level commitment to build capacity for forest law enforcement, in particular relating to 
illegal logging and hunting, associated trade, and corruption.119 Because the ministerial-
level focus of AFLEG proceeds at a fairly high level of generality and encompasses a 
number of states, I will focus on the experience of one of the participating AFLEG states, 
Cameroon, which has taken substantial steps in developing its forest protection efforts. 
Timber is the second biggest export in Cameroon.  As an effort to improve the 
efficiency of the timber industry, increase tax compliance by logging firms, and improve 
the welfare of local and indigenous peoples through community involvement in forest 
management, Cameroon enacted the Forest Act of 1994 (the “Act”).120 The Act came 
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into existence in part through the World Bank making it a matter of conditionality, but 
required additional efforts lasting approximately five years for it to become 
implemented.121 Because of its focus on preserving forests as a source of an 
economically important resource, the Act combines concern for the environment with 
broader development priorities.122 
The Ministry of Environment and Forests administers the Act through the Central 
Control Unit (CCU).  The law initiates a decentralized program of forest management.  
Local communities were given the right to manage up to 5000 hectares of forest on a 25 
year rotation pursuant to a management plan.  Communities incur expenses for filing the 
plans but then reap royalties in the form of leases to logging companies.  Taxes assessed 
on the central government level for forest activities were also shared with local 
communities.   Private firms must obtain Forest Management Units that entitle them to 
log over a given area for a specified period, subject to regeneration requirements.123 
The CCU monitors compliance with the Act through field inspections.  After 
substantial evidence of corruption and irregularities in the forestry sector, the 
international NGO, Global Witness, was invited by the Government of Cameroon in 2000 
to work alongside the CCU inspectors and other Ministry departments to provide 
independent observation.124 In addition to providing this independent verification, Global 
Witness acts to build capacity among the inspectorate.  It publishes periodic reports 
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detailing compliance with the law, practices of the inspectors including failure to sanction 
observed violations. 
On the positive side, according to the Independent Observation reports issued by 
Global Witness, since the system of independent observation began, the issuance of 
official statements and prosecutions for illegal logging have increased.125 As a result of 
program of law enforcement and independent monitoring, significant illegal logging 
practices are more exposed in Cameroon than in neighboring countries.126 On the 
negative side, Global Witness has also exposed cases involving non-transparent or 
apparently corrupt practices by the Ministry, evidenced by the lack of scrutiny over 
permit violations by certain private firms.127 The Ministry has also appeared reluctant to 
issue official statements regarding offenses and appears lethargic and non-transparent 
regarding fines.128 Likewise, the standards for documenting detected infractions appear 
inadequate for judicial proceedings and CCU personnel undertake the inspection missions 
with inadequate preparation.129 Global Witness recommends a program of training to 
build capacity within the institution. 
The lesson of the Cameroon process is that through sustained involvement of the 
international community, including bilateral and multilateral donors and the NGO sector, 
local law and enforcement capacity can be enhanced.   The Cameroon forestry initiative 
has not been without its critics.  In particular, the extent to which community-based 
governance approach has actually worked is a matter of great contention.  As the Global 
Witness review suggests, problems of corruption and competence undermine the 
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effectiveness of the CCU.130 But analysis suggests that there is cause for optimism.  In 
the words of one observer, the shortcomings may be attributed to “growing pains” as the 
state comes to terms with administering the new law.  To development professionals 
working with state governing and legal institutions, the challenges Cameroon faces are 
familiar.  Having already created a workable legislative framework, it must prevent 
corrupt practices from infecting its inspection function, develop enforcement capacity, 
prosecute cases to conclusion, and improve its competence in carrying out its oversight 
functions.  Meeting those challenges could make Cameroon an example for the Congo 
Basin region.131 
VI. Conclusion 
The notion that states should defer to international voluntary CSR initiatives as a 
way of regulating important aspects of their economies, in such areas as labor, human 
rights, and the environment, assumes erroneously that states will not need to develop this 
capacity.132 To the contrary, globalization of production and trade is unlikely to stop in 
our lifetimes.  States need to develop the relevant capacity sooner rather than later. 
The AFLEG initiative and Cameroonian efforts to enhance traditional state 
regulatory and enforcement capacity rather than advance some sort of voluntary CSR 
approach targeted at MNCs may be indicative of the international community’s desire to 
develop a rigorous response to the issue of forest conservation.  If this conclusion is 
indeed true, then there may be reason to conclude that the matters taken up by voluntary 
CSR programs simply do not enjoy the degree of political support needed to get serious 
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about the issues.  Viewed in this way, voluntary CSR is a sort of pragmatic compromise 
while the international community weighs the need to take more forceful action.  
Unfortunately, rather than take a developmentalist approach—viewing these programs as 
transitional efforts on the way to more rigorous domestic regulation over CSR matters—
the discourse surrounding voluntary CSR employs the same broad brush optimism that 
characterized Utopian visions in the past.  Dropping down from universal heights, it 
promises straight-forward solutions that will overlay the entire international economy.  
On this view, all of the old rules no longer apply and, under the new rules, all of our 
problems will magically disappear.   
Given the predominance of market economies in today’s world, getting regulation right 
must be a priority.  Voluntary measures can only play a role if basic regulatory 
frameworks are established.  Contrary to the self-regulatory assumptions of voluntary 
CSR proponents, state regulation of the environment and labor rights and enforcement of 
human rights and anti-corruption laws, cannot be outsourced to international or private 
voluntary organizations.  Empowerment of domestic regulators is an essential component 
of the struggle to realize the positive benefits of capitalist development while limiting its 
negative aspects.  As experience with the New Economy showed, we ought to be 
skeptical of anyone suggesting that the rules of the game have shifted fundamentally such 
that the old problems are no longer problems.  This article contends that despite the 
increasing dependence of firms in OECD countries on production based in developing 
countries, the challenges are the same unglamorous challenges that regulators have faced 
throughout the process of industrialization.  Contrary to the universalistic aspirations of 
CSR, strengthening domestic regulatory and enforcement institutions in developing 
countries is messy work, involving processes of trial and error.  We know the limitations 
but must not understate the benefits of the monopoly on coercive power held by state 
regulatory authorities.  It is at a great peril that we cede these responsibilities to untested 
methods that intuition, analysis, and experience suggest are bound to fail.  
 
